Donald Trump, the anti-Muslim far right and the new conservative revolution by Pertwee, Edward
Donald Trump, the anti-Muslim far right and the new conservative 
revolution
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104037/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Pertwee, Edward ORCID: 0000-0002-9089-1649 (2020) Donald Trump, the anti-
Muslim far right and the new conservative revolution. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 
ISSN 0141-9870 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1749688
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 
licence. This licence allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even 
commercially, as long as you credit the authors for the original work. More information 
and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rers20
Ethnic and Racial Studies
ISSN: 0141-9870 (Print) 1466-4356 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20
Donald Trump, the anti-Muslim far right and the
new conservative revolution
Ed Pertwee
To cite this article: Ed Pertwee (2020): Donald Trump, the anti-Muslim far right and the new
conservative revolution, Ethnic and Racial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2020.1749688
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1749688
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 17 Apr 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 193
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Donald Trump, the anti-Muslim far right and the new
conservative revolution
Ed Pertwee
Department of Sociology, London School of Economics, London, UK
ABSTRACT
This article explores the “counter-jihad”, a transnational field of anti-Muslim political
action that emerged in the mid-2000s, becoming a key tributary of the recent far-
right insurgency and an important influence on the Trump presidency. The article
draws on thematic analysis of content from counter-jihad websites and interviews
with movement activists, sympathizers and opponents, in order to characterize the
counter-jihad’s organizational infrastructure and political discourse and to theorize
its relationship to fascism and other far-right tendencies. Although the political
discourses of the counter-jihad, Trumpian Republicanism and the avowedly racist
“Alt-Right” are not identical, I argue that all three tendencies share a common,
counterrevolutionary temporal structure. Consequently, like “classical” Italian
Fascism and German National Socialism, they can be seen as historically and
contextually-specific forms of “revolutionary conservatism”.
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Introduction
A tourist visiting London’s Trafalgar Square on 9 June 2018 would have been
greeted by a curious spectacle. A large crowd had congregated there, perhaps
10,000 strong, and it was in an ugly mood. Comprising supporters of Stephen
Yaxley-Lennon, a former leader of the anti-Muslim English Defence League
(EDL) better known by the pseudonym “Tommy Robinson”, the crowd
carried placards bearing Robinson’s image and occasionally broke into
noisy chants of “Oh, Tommy, Tommy!”. Following his jailing the previous
month, for breaching reporting restrictions in a child sex abuse case,
Lennon had become a cause célèbre in international far-right circles where
he was seen as a courageous defender of free speech. The June demon-
stration was addressed by Geert Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom,
the most successful single-issue anti-Islam party in Europe; the former
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United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leadership candidate and current
leader of the For Britain party, Anne Marie Waters; and former Breitbart
London editor Raheem Kassam (Hope not Hate 2018a). The crowd included
former EDL activists, UKIP and For Britain members, supporters of the “Foot-
ball Lads Alliance”, and activists from the “identitarian” movement, the
nearest European analogue of the American “Alt-Right”. The event turned
violent when a few hundred demonstrators clashed with police, calling
them “scum” and hurling bottles and traffic cones at police lines.
The international mobilization in support of Yaxley-Lennon during summer
2018 symbolized the coalescence of a new transatlantic far-right movement.
On 8 July the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum (MEF), a self-styled
watchdog on “radical Islam”, issued a press release claiming that it had pro-
vided funding and logistical support for the “Free Tommy” event and announ-
cing another on 14 July (Middle East Forum 2018). The MEF sponsored the
Arizona Congressman Paul Gosar, a pro-Trump Republican, to travel to
London for the July rally where he shared a platform with Filip de Winter of
Flemish Interest, Kent Ekeroth of the Sweden Democrats, Jérôme Rivière of
the French National Rally (formerly the National Front), and Debbie Robinson
of the anti-Muslim Q Society of Australia (Hope not Hate 2018b). Besides
Gosar, other high-profile Americans to support Lennon included Donald
Trump Jr. and former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon (Townsend
2018). Reportedly, Donald Trump’s Ambassador for International Religious
Freedom even raised Lennon’s case with the British ambassador in Washing-
ton. Lennon also received vocal support from fringe North American figures
like Gavin McInnes of the “Western chauvinist” fraternity the Proud Boys,
and Ezra Levant of the Canadian Rebel Media, for whom Lennon worked
after leaving the EDL. Moreover, around thirty-five percent of tweets using
the #FreeTommy hashtag came from the US (Hermannson 2018).
These political alliances may seem puzzling. To be sure, many of those
involved are often characterized as part of a “right-populist” insurgency that
has become adept at mobilizing demotic anti-Muslim sentiment, partly by
exploiting social media. However, digitized expressions of ideological sympathy
are one thing; the material interlinkages, organizational infrastructure and
mobilizing power on display at the London “Free Tommy” events quite
another. Why would an influential and well-resourced advocacy group like
the MEF, which seeks political respectability, invest time and resources in a
street-level activist and convicted criminal, who is a marginal figure in UK dom-
estic politics? Why would a serving US congressman fly five thousand miles to
address a crowd of English football hooligans? Why would the Trump adminis-
tration expend political capital lobbying British diplomats on Lennon’s behalf?
Answering these questions requires an understanding of the political
milieu from which Lennon emerged: a transnational field of anti-Muslim pol-
itical action known as the “counter-jihad”. The counter-jihad evolved during
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the 2000s, initially outside the organizational spaces of neo-fascism and
drawing on a distinct set of intellectual resources, including the “clash of
civilizations” literature associated with the US Orientalists Bernard Lewis
and Samuel Huntington, and the “Eurabia” literature associated with the
Swiss-Israeli conspiracy theorist Gisèle Littman (“Bat Ye’Or”). The political
geography of the counter-jihad is primarily transatlantic, although its
wider networks extend as far as Israel and Australia: essentially, it is a move-
ment of the white diaspora. The variety of white nationalism cultivated
within the counter-jihad was, at the time it first emerged, a novel one.
For the Hitlerian philosophy of history as Darwinian struggle between
different biological “races”, in which the Jew was cast as the antitype of
the Aryan, it substituted a culturalist melodrama of agonistic struggle
between radically incommensurable “civilizations”, in which “Islam” was
cast as the youthful and virile antitype to the moribund husk of the
“Judeo-Christian West”. The influence of these ideas on far-right groups in
Europe, North America and Australasia, and especially on Trumpian Repub-
licanism, is difficult to overstate. Yet the counter-jihad remains under-
researched despite its brief moment in the sun after the 2011 Oslo mas-
sacre, whose perpetrator, Anders Breivik, made extensive use of counter-
jihadist texts in his “manifesto” (Gardell 2014).1 This contrasts with the atten-
tion devoted to more recent and ephemeral tendencies such as the “Alt-
Right”, despite the latter lacking the counter-jihad’s organizational infrastruc-
ture and influence on institutional politics.
This article locates the counter-jihad as a key tributary of the recent far-
right insurgency, characterizes its organizational infrastructure and political
discourse, and theorizes its relationship to other far-right tendencies. It
draws on thematic analysis of content from ninety-seven websites identified
as linked to the movement using an online social network analysis, together
with eighteen semi-structured interviews with counter-jihad movement acti-
vists, sympathizers and opponents.2 The article argues that the counter-jihad
has shaped the contemporary far right through: its significant organizational
infrastructure and ability to mobilize resources; its development of a new far-
right metanarrative, which, in positing “Islam” as a transcendent threat to
“Western values”, is able to appeal to groups historically excluded by the far
right, notably Jews and gays; and finally, its role as a bridge between Trumpian
Republicanism and the far-right “fringe”. In conclusion, it is argued that the
synergies between the counter-jihad, Trumpian Republicanism and the Alt-
Right stem from their common, counterrevolutionary temporal structure.
Hence, like “classical” Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, they
can all be seen as historically and contextually-specific forms of “revolutionary
conservatism” in the formal sense of that term proposed by Peter Osborne: a
species of ultra-reactionary politics which differs from “mainstream” conserva-
tism insofar as “it understands that what it would ‘conserve’ is already lost (if
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indeed it ever existed, which is doubtful), and hence must be created anew”
(Osborne 1995, 164).3
The organizational infrastructure of the counter-jihad
The organizational infrastructure evident at the 2018 “Free Tommy” events
has evolved since the mid-2000s, when the counter-jihad first emerged as a
novel far-right tendency, distinct from neo-fascism. Its early organized mani-
festations in Europe included “Defence Leagues” and “Stop Islamization”
groups in various countries, campaigns to “ban the burqa”, and mobilizations
against mosques and minarets, one of which achieved success in 2009 when
Switzerland imposed a ban on minaret construction following a popular refer-
endum (Bhatt 2012). The EDL, which Lennon led between 2009 and 2013, was
the most important of this first wave of counter-jihad organizations, providing
an early demonstration of the potential for anxieties about Islam to generate
reactionary political alliances across ethnic and religious lines, and becoming
an inspiration for mimetic “Defence Leagues” in countries such as Norway,
Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Canada and
Australia.
Drawing its support primarily from football hooligan “firms”, the EDL
expanded rapidly after its founding in summer 2009 through a series of pro-
vocative demonstrations in multi-ethnic cities like Birmingham, Leicester and
Bradford. Whilst some activists, including Lennon, had been involved with the
neo-fascist British National Party (BNP), the majority were political neophytes
who disavowed racism and fascism (Busher 2016; Pilkington 2016). The EDL’s
novelty lay in its vocal support for Israel, its professed sympathy for groups
historically excluded by the far right, such as Jews and gays, on the basis
that they too were “victims” of Islam, and its appropriation of the political
language of human rights. These themes were reflected in its Mission State-
ment, in which it claimed to be “a human rights organisation” set up to
oppose
forms of religiously-inspired intolerance and barbarity… including, but not
limited to, the denigration and oppression of women, the molestation of
young children, the committing of so-called honour killings, homophobia,
anti-Semitism, and continued support for those responsible for terrorist atroci-
ties. (English Defence League 2011)
The distance between the EDL and neo-fascism was symbolized by its LGBT
and Jewish “divisions”, which, despite their minuscule membership, were
among the EDL’s more active (Copsey 2010; Jackson 2011). The EDL briefly
formed an electoral pact with the British Freedom Party, led by Paul
Weston, which later became Liberty GB. At its peak, around 2011, the EDL
could mobilize up to 3,000 supporters but it had already gone into sharp
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decline before Lennon’s departure in October 2013. There were efforts to
establish a pan-European Defence League, between 2010 and 2012, but
these proved unsuccessful.
Subsequently, Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the
West) emerged as the most important grassroots counter-jihad network in
Europe. Starting in October 2014, Pegida supporters gathered every
Monday night for an “evening stroll” in central Dresden, with the compara-
tively genteel style of these events enabling the group to attract support
from lower middle-class burghers with no prior far-right connections (de
Genova 2015; Dostal 2015). The demonstrations grew rapidly, from 350 par-
ticipants at the first rally on 20 October, to an estimated 17,500 just before
Christmas, before peaking at around 25,000 after the January 2015 terror
attacks in Paris (Virchow 2016, 544). Mimetic mobilizations occurred on a
smaller scale in Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and
the UK (Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016), where an abortive Pegida group
fronted by Lennon, Weston and Waters formed in late 2015. However, as
with the earlier network of Defence Leagues, Pegida is more a political fran-
chise than a formal organizational structure.
The North American counter-jihad evolved separately from its European
counterpart during the early 2000s and the aftermath of 9/11, acquiring
greater momentum during the Obama presidency, in the context of racialized
anxieties about the nationality and faith of the country’s first black president.
Whereas the European wing has been dominated by loosely-organized street-
protest movements, the North American counter-jihad is headed by professio-
nalized and well-resourced advocacy groups. Arguably the most important is
the Center for Security Policy (CSP), a Washington, D.C. “think tank” founded in
1988 by Frank Gaffney, a former official in the Reagan administration, who
once described Obama as “America’s first Muslim president”. Whilst the
Center claims to be concerned with various “challenges and opportunities
likely to affect American security” (CSP 2017), in practice it is almost entirely
focused on countering a phantasmal Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy to infil-
trate the US government. In February 2016 it launched a public counter-jihad
campaign and website, counterjihad.com.
Other key US-based advocacy organizations include the David Horowitz
Freedom Center (DHFC), founded in 1988 by former Trotskyite David Horo-
witz; the Middle East Forum (MEF), founded in 1990 by writer and historian
Daniel Pipes, which recently supported the London “Free Tommy” events;
and the Gatestone Institute, founded in 2012 by conservative activist and phi-
lanthropist Nina Rosenwald. Among the DHFC’s many projects are Jihad
Watch, the most popular counter-jihad blog; “Discover the Networks”, a data-
base of the US Left; and FrontPage, an online magazine edited by Jamie
Glazov, whose internet TV show, The Glazov Gang, broadcasts interviews
with leading counter-jihad figures. The MEF has provided financial support
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to European counter-jihad activists, including Lennon and Wilders, through its
“Legal Project”; surveils academics deemed sympathetic to Islam through its
“Campus Watch” programme; and sponsors the blog Islamist Watch. Gate-
stone has played a key role in bringing together mainstream advocates for
Israel with the anti-Muslim conspiracist fringe (Blumenthal 2012), sponsoring
events with establishment conservatives like Harvard law professor Alan Der-
showitz and British Conservative peer Daniel Finkelstein, whilst its website
carries writings by Bat Ye’Or and her Norwegian disciple, the blogger Peder
Jensen (“Fjordman”), a key influence on Breivik.
The nearest grassroots equivalent to the European street movements is
ACT for America, founded in 2007 by Brigitte Gabriel, a Lebanese Maronite
Christian who came to prominence as a TV anchor for Pat Robertson’s Chris-
tian Broadcasting Network. Presenting itself as “the NRA [National Rifle Associ-
ation] of national security” (Act for America 2017), by 2016 ACT had an annual
budget of over $1 million and claimed to have 300,000 members across the
US (Noriega 2016), although these figures are disputed by civil rights
groups (Piggott 2017). ACT’s annual conference has been addressed by
Texas Senator and 2016 Republican presidential contender Ted Cruz, and
former Republican congressman Mike Pompeo, Trump’s second Secretary of
State. ACT has also provided the grassroots “muscle” for state-level anti-
sharia initiatives, working closely with the lawyer David Yerushalmi, founder
of the Society of Americans for National Existence and the American
Freedom Law Centre, who is also in-house counsel at the CSP.
Other activist groups include the United West, a Florida-based organization
dedicated to “defending and advancing Western Civilization against the
kinetic and cultural onslaught of Shariah Islam” (The United West 2016), and
the Clarion Project, which has been linked to the Jewish fundamentalist
organization “Fire of the Torah”, and whose film Obsession: Radical Islam’s
War Against the West was distributed to a staggering 28 million people in
swing states before the 2008 presidential election (Goldberg 2008). Much of
the funding for the US counter-jihad groups comes from a handful of right-
wing philanthropic organizations, including the Richard Mellon Scaife Foun-
dations, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Newton D. & Rochelle
F. Becker Foundations and Charitable Trust, the Russell Berrie Foundation,
the Rosenwald Family Fund, the Alan and Hope Winters Family Foundation,
the Fairbrook Foundation, and the Donors Capital Fund, the latter being a
charitable giving vehicle through which a single anonymous $17 million
donation was funnelled to the Clarion Project in 2008 to pay for the DVD dis-
tribution of Obsession (Duss et al. 2015).
During the late 2000s and early 2010s, European and North American
counter-jihad groups began to form alliances. For instance, EDL activists
attended a September 2010 protest in New York against the so-called
“Ground Zero Mosque”, sponsored by the Freedom Defense Initiative and
6 E. PERTWEE
Stop Islamization of America, both fronted by the bloggers Robert Spencer
(Jihad Watch) and Pamela Geller (Atlas Shrugs) (Booth 2010). The event was
addressed byWilders, with video addresses by GeorgeW. Bush’s former ambas-
sador to the UN, John Bolton, and the late Andrew Breitbart, founder of Breitbart
News. These alliances between elements of the Christian and Jewish religious
right in North America and secular far-right groups in Europe have not been
without friction. When Geller, who is Jewish, publicly denounced the EDL
after the head of its Jewish division, Roberta Moore, resigned in June 2011
citing the leadership’s failure to contain the “Nazis within” (Geller 2011;
Lipman 2011), a number of key movement figures wrote an open letter accus-
ing Geller of driving “a completely needless wedge between the American and
European wings of the international Counterjihad” (May et al. 2011).
The counter-jihad harnessed the power of the internet quickly and effec-
tively during the 2000s. Blogs such as Jihad Watch, Atlas Shrugs, Gates of
Vienna, Fjordman, and Brussels Journal were crucial to the development and
dissemination of its ideology. When it formed in 2009, the EDL was one of
the first far-right groups to eschew paper magazines and newsletters entirely
in favour of online communication via its website and Facebook page, which
had almost 100,000 followers at its peak (Cleland, Anderson, and Aldridge-
Deacon 2018, 1542–43). Such was the importance of the latter in the organ-
ization of its protests that one scholar described the group as “a child of
the Facebook revolution” (Copsey 2010). Breivik, who commented on Gates
of Vienna in 2008 and on EDL message boards in 2011, wrote in his manifesto
that online social networking sites “will be essential in the decades to come
for consolidation/recruitment purposes”, urging all “patriots” who were not
yet on Facebook to “shape up and adapt” (Berwick 2011, 1267). By the late
2010s, some movement figureheads like Lennon and Geller boasted over a
million social media followers.
During the late 2000s, several transnational counter-jihad organizations
were established, sometimes as direct products of prior online interactions.
One group, the International Civil Liberties Alliance, traces its origins to a
2006 comments thread on Gates of Vienna. It sponsored a series of inter-
national counter-jihad conferences between 2007 and 2013, which brought
together key American and European activists to discuss movement strategy.
At the 2010 conference in Zurich, a pseudonymous EDL representative gave a
presentation entitled “The Anatomy of an EDL Demo”:
The presentation included organisational dynamics, deployment, logistics and
transportation, the importance of having productive working relations with the
police, the stewarding system, divisional structure, inclusivity of all those who
have a stake in or interest in opposing sharia to create a diverse, varied and
effective organisation, the networking and social possibilities that are created by
demonstrations, opposition tactics, and the issue ofmerchandising and its relation-
ship to the creation of group identity and organisational presence. (“Aeneas” 2010)
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Other transnational organizations dating from this time include the Inter-
national Free Press Society (IFPS), established by Danish writer Lars Hedegaard
in 2009 and Stop Islamization of Nations, an umbrella organization for the
American and European “Stop Islamization” groups. Whilst some organiz-
ations discussed here are now disbanded or in abeyance, the networks they
fostered have endured.
The political discourse of the counter-jihad
This heterogeneous political coalition was drawn together by an apocalyptic
narrative of Western crisis, decline and capitulation to Islamic conquest, and a
conspiratorial narrative of left-liberal collusion with Muslims to bring about
the “Islamization of the West”. Significantly, as is evident from its key intellec-
tual inspiration, the “Eurabia” literature, the capitulation is conceived as chiefly
European and only secondarily American. This ultraconservative narrative of
European vulnerability to Islamic subversion first took shape in the early-
mid-2000s, in the context of the Iraq war protests, the assassination of Theo
van Gogh and the death threats against Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the transport bomb-
ings in Madrid and London, the riots in the Parisian banlieues, and the Danish
cartoons affair. Ye’Or’s Eurabia: the Euro-Arab Axis (2005) is the canonical work
of the genre (Bangstad 2013; Larsson 2012), but extemporizations on her basic
theme can be found in the work of many conservative writers during the late
2000s and 2010s, such as Melanie Phillips, Mark Steyn, Bruce Bawer, Christo-
pher Caldwell, Douglas Murray and, more recently, Alt-Right-linked figures
such as Lauren Southern and Raheem Kassam.
The conclusive differentiator between counter-jihadist and more main-
stream conservative laments about Western decline is the former’s decidedly
conspiratorial framing, exemplified by one comment on Gates of Vienna:
I… cannot believe that it is mere coincidence that merely all westerna (sic)
nations are collapsing at the same time and for the same reason. This must
be orchestrated. (online comment on May 2009)
Muslims are consequently joined in the “newest phase” of their unending,
cosmic war against the West (May 2004) by a familiar right-wing demonology:
the “liberal elite”, the academy, the mass media, the EU and the “68 move-
ment” in its various (anti-racist, feminist and other) forms, who aid and abet
“Islamization”. Together these internal and external enemies form the “Red-
Green Axis” (Simpson 2019). Their occult project (the “stealth jihad”) is
advanced through the physical colonization of European territory and
gradual annexation of parts of its major cities (Muslim-controlled “no-go
zones”); the cultural subjugation of European populations and their transform-
ation into second-class citizens (“dhimmitude”); the “fanatical fecundity” of
Muslim populations in Europe (the “demographic timebomb”); and the
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deliberate grooming of young white girls by predatory Muslim males (the
“rape jihad”).
Importantly, “Islamization” is not strictly coextensive with the presence of
Muslims or visible symbols of “Islam”, but functions as a metonym for
broader processes of cultural and demographic change. Recurrent themes
in the discourse of grassroots activists are of one’s identity being “under
attack”, of feeling like “a foreigner in one’s own country”, and of cultural
and demographic “inundation” (interview data, 2015–17). Asked to describe
his party’s main priorities, one activist with Liberty GB offered the following:
Well, we’re primarily concerned about the way in which Britain is changing, and
there are a number of factors which we feel are changing it for the worse.
Obviously mass immigration, which is not only eradicating British culture from
parts of the country but actually eradicating communities, entire English com-
munities are being wiped off the map due to mass immigration. The other
issue is the way that the hard Left as represented in the Labour Party and
other organizations have been very effective in downgrading and eroding
British culture, eroding the sense of British identity, and basically denigrating
everything that this country stands for. (Liberty GB official, 2015, interview
with the author)
The threat against which the counter-jihad nominally defines itself figured
almost as a footnote: “And then, of course, Islam”. This response is typical in
that its major preoccupations (immigration, national identity and political rep-
resentation) are, at best, tangentially related to Islam and Muslims. Similarly,
grassroots counter-jihad groups have not only directed their violence
towards Muslims, but also towards Sikhs, Hindus, secular Asians and non-
Muslim refugees. That the antagonisms around which the counter-jihad
mobilizes are primarily ethnic and not religious is also evident in the language
of “English Defence”, “Patriotic Europeanism” and “Western chauvinism”.
The figuration of Europe within the counter-jihadist geopolitical imaginary,
as the frontline battlefield in a planetary “clash of civilizations” between the
(white) “Western” and (non-white but especially) Muslim worlds, is key to
understanding how the European and North American movements relate to
one another. As one British anti-racist activist described it, American
counter-jihadists view Europe as the “trenches of the war” and see grassroots
movements like the EDL and Pegida as “kind of frontline foot-soldiers fighting
the Islamization of Europe”. This partly explains their different organizational
forms and tactical repertoires: the Americans “don’t need” street movements
due to the perception that Islamization “hasn’t got that far yet” in the US, and
that there is still time to pursue policies and enact legislation that will curtail it
(British anti-racist activist, 2016, interview with the author). Hence, while the
main tactic of grassroots groups in Europe is disruptive protest, ACT
engages in strategic campaigns to change what is taught about Islam in
American schools, and to prohibit the use of sharia in state courthouses
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(David Yerushalmi’s “American Laws for American Courts” measures) on the
basis that the “time to put up the block” is “before the train gets too far
down the tracks” (Elliott 2011). But the view from five thousand miles
across the Atlantic is emphatic: “Europe is lost, Europe is gone, it’s a
warzone” (British anti-racist activist, 2016, interview with the author).
Crucial to this narrative are a number of “travelling evangelists” who cross
the Atlantic preaching the gospel of a fallen Europe. Often marginal figures in
their own countries, they can be very influential within the wider network. For
instance, Lars Hedegaard of the IFPS and Paul Weston of Liberty GB and
Pegida UK took part in a panel event at the 2016 US Conservative Political
Action Conference entitled “The Global Jihad Movement in America and the
Counterjihad Campaign”, sponsored by the CSP. There Hedegaard suggested
that “Europe as we knew it is just a few years away from a complete break-
down”, due to it “being inundated by millions of so-called refugees…who
have proven to be impossible to integrate”, resulting in “a system of parallel
societies, enclaves where certain people live, enclaves where other types of
people live”, who “will not have much to do with each other except for inter-
mittent low-level warfare”. Agreeing, Weston added “I don’t think it will be
resolved peacefully”:
I think probably we are going to be looking at a civil war scenario in the same
way that Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s, and the civil war in Lebanon in
the 1970s, I think this is the future of Europe… it’s going to be cataclysmic.
The message these European speakers had for their American audience was
simple: “do not let what has happened in Europe… happen to America”
(CSP 2016).
This dystopian fantasy of European cultural and demographic submersion
under a rising “green tide” is, in essence, a racially-coded attack on European
social democracy. As Ned May (“Baron Bodissey”), editor of the influential
counter-jihad blog Gates of Vienna, puts it: the “Jihad is just a symptom” –
the real enemy “lies within” (May 2006). The “real enemy” is the secular
leftist politics of multiculturalism, feminism and state welfare that allegedly
enable “Islamization”, which exist in European caricature to vindicate Ameri-
can conservative values of faith and freedom, and to exalt the US assimilation-
ist “melting pot”. Consequently, Eurabian evangelists can expect an
enthusiastic reception from US conservatives when claiming, for instance,
that Europe “is careening over the multicultural cliff” (May 2016a), that its
welfare states will inevitably self-destruct due to their in-built tendency to
attract “uninvited foreigners” who reap their benefits without contributing,
or that European social democracy is destined to “go down in flames” (CSP
2016). Numerous obituaries for free speech in Europe likewise set up the
US, with its quasi-absolutist commitment to free speech enshrined in the
First Amendment, as a dramatic counterpoint to the restrictions on “hate
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speech” that exist in many European legal systems. One US civil rights activist
emphasized how emotive this issue is, arguing that for many Americans free
speech is “sacrosanct… it’s holy ground that should not ever be touched”;
consequently, when European counter-jihad activists are prosecuted for
“hate speech” or the like, their American sympathizers “essentially consider
them as political prisoners and martyrs” (US civil rights activist, 2017, interview
with the author). Yaxley-Lennon is only the most recent addition to the
counter-jihadist martyrology, joining Wilders, Weston and Hedegaard, all of
whom have faced legal action in their respective countries.
For European counter-jihadists, “Eurabia” is a melancholic lamentation for a
mythic white, Christian European past (Aktürk 2012), whereas the US political
right invokes it as a portent of America’s future (Pilbeam 2011). Consequently,
it serves as a powerful rhetorical weapon against domestic political opponents
and liberal policies such as healthcare reform and refugee resettlement. That it
also underwrites a potent narrative of American exceptionalism is evident
from the response of Hedegaard and Weston’s American interlocutor, the
CSP’s Jim Hanson: “Aren’t you happy to be in America?”:
America… is the shining city on the hill… is still the exceptional nation. And
we’ve done it better than it’s ever been done because we’ve got a First Amend-
ment… [W]hat happened to Europe does not have to happen here. (CSP 2016).
The effectiveness of this discourse depends on a ready supply of Europeans
willing to corroborate these dire warnings about the consequences of social
democracy, who receive moral, political and material support in return.
The counter-jihad, Trump and white nationalism
The 2016 US presidential election brought the far-right insurgency in Europe
and North America into public consciousness. Media coverage of the election
foregrounded the role within the Trump coalition of the “Alt-Right”, character-
ized by George Hawley as an “atomized, amorphous, predominantly online,
and mostly anonymous” movement of white nationalists, anti-feminists,
autarkists and avowed neo-Nazis, united by a shared opposition to liberalism
and egalitarianism (Hawley 2017, 3–5). Following Trump’s victory, a flurry of
books and reports appeared with titles like “The Alt-Right Comes to Washing-
ton” (Schreckinger 2017), and “Alt-Right: from 4chan to the White House”
(Wendling 2018). This focus on the “alternative right” was justified in the
sense that the 2016 election marked an inflection point when various hetero-
dox right-wing tendencies (re-)emerged to challenge the US conservative
movement from the right. However, any implication that the Alt-Right in
the original sense of that term, a racial-separatist political project to bring
about a white “ethno-state” in North America, had gained direct influence
over administration policy is quite misleading. Rather, if any far-right
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 11
movement gained tangible political power as a result of Trump’s election, it
was the counter-jihad. During the Republican primaries, the CSP supplied
advisors to the Trump and Cruz campaigns, while Bobby Jindal and Ben
Carson warned of an Islamic “colonization” of Europe and a Muslim Brother-
hood conspiracy to infiltrate the US government. When Trump first proposed
a total ban on Muslim immigration in December 2015, he justified the policy
by citing a methodologically dubious survey of American Muslims conducted
on behalf of the CSP (UGBI 2015).
The links between the Trump administration and US counter-jihad move-
ment are too numerous to document here, so a few examples will have to
suffice. Retired Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn, Trump’s first national security advisor,
was at the time of his appointment a sitting board member of ACT for
America. Flynn’s successor-but-one, John Bolton, is a former chair of the Gate-
stone Institute. Trump’s former Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, has received
awards from the CSP and DHFC. Mike Pompeo has spoken at ACT’s annual
conference and sponsored events for the group inside the Capitol building.
Shortly after Trump’s victory, ACT boasted to supporters that it had “a
direct line to President-elect Trump through our allies such as…Mike
Pompeo” (Center for New Community 2017). Steve Bannon, the former
White House Chief Strategist, hosted Gaffney at least thirty-four times on
his radio programme during his time as head of Breitbart News (UGBI 2017).
Finally, Trump himself attended the launch of The United West in March
2011, where he posed for a photograph with Gaffney (May 2016b), while
ACT’s Brigitte Gabriel has been a guest at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort and
visited the White House for a meeting with officials in March 2017.
Trump’s speeches belong to the same discursive formation as the counter-
jihadist prophecies of Western crisis and decline. In his inauguration address,
Trump spoke in apocalyptic terms of “American carnage”, of “rusted out fac-
tories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation”, and of a
nation blighted by “the crime and the gangs and the drugs”, whilst also pled-
ging to “unite the world against radical Islamic terrorism” which he vowed to
“eradicate from the face of the Earth” (White House 2017a). The influence of
counter-jihadist ideas on his presidency is evident in the language of the
January 2017 executive order banning travel from seven Muslim-majority
countries, which claims to exclude “those who would place violent ideologies
over American law” (White House 2017b). As one journalist noted, the “Muslim
ban” made little sense as counterterrorism policy, given that no immigrant
from any of the seven countries had ever killed anyone in a terrorist attack
on American soil, but it made considerable sense if you believed that the Euro-
pean half of Western civilization had been lost to Islamic colonization, and
your aim was to prevent the US going the same way (Beauchamp 2017).
By the time Trump assumed office in early 2017, the counter-jihad had
effectively been subsumed into a broader, translocal white nationalist
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movement that sees Trump as its key political figurehead. Together with
forms of right-populism, libertarianism, anti-feminism and conspiracism, the
counter-jihad is now a key component of the “culturalist” wing of this move-
ment, popularly referred to as the “Alt-Lite” to distinguish it from the avowedly
racist and misogynist “Alt-Right”. The influence of the counter-jihad is evident
in the mobilization of the “Islamization” and “Eurabia” themes by far-right poli-
ticians and parties across Europe, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán, Czech President Miloš Zeman, former Italian Deputy Prime Minister
Matteo Salvini, and the Alternative for Germany (Brown 2019). It is also
evident in the assimilation of counter-jihadist language by formerly distinct
tendencies, such as anti-feminist “men’s rights” activism. For the former Breit-
bart technology editor Milo Yiannopoulous, who came to prominence
through the 2014 “Gamergate” campaign of organized harassment against
female games developers and journalists, Islam now ranks alongside feminism
as one of the two key problems facing America today (Mondon and Winter
2017, 2168–69). Similarly, the European “identitarian” movement blends the
counter-jihadist narrative of “Islamization” with the explicitly racialized narra-
tive of a “Great Replacement” of “indigenous” Europeans by “non-European
migrants”, a variation on the Alt-Right theme of “white genocide”. Signifi-
cantly, when the leading identitarian, the Austrian Martin Sellner, was
barred from the UK in March 2018, Yaxley-Lennon stepped in to deliver his
speech.
To the extent that clear blue water remains between the counter-jihad and
the Alt-Right, this is largely because the counter-jihad includes strongly pro-
Israeli tendencies that would find the anti-Semitism within the Alt-Right
abhorrent. Conversely, for many Alt-Rightists, the counter-jihad is a “false
friend” as one contributor to the white-nationalist Counter-Currents blog
puts it, insofar as counter-jihadists conceive Western identity in civilizational
terms, as an agglomeration of “abstract values (personal freedom, free
markets, tolerance…)”, rather than in strictly racial terms, as an “in-group
… bound by DNA, religion, culture, language” (Lane 2016). Worse still, for
the Alt-Right, counter-jihadists typically see these values as products of an
enduring “Judeo-Christian tradition”. Some white nationalists see the
counter-jihad itself as part of the “world-Jewish conspiracy”, emphasizing
the Jewish backgrounds of leading activists and financiers such as Geller, Hor-
owitz and Rosenwald, and the philo-Zionism of others like Lennon and
Wilders. For instance, in 2012, former BNP leader Nick Griffin published an
“exposé” of the EDL which portrayed it as a “Zionist” (sic) false flag operation,
“using legitimate concerns about Islam to… try to split and distract the
genuine nationalist movement” (Griffin 2013, 3).
However, the political distance between the “culturalist” and “racialist”
wings of the contemporary far right masks a deeper philosophical affinity
that can provide a basis for political cooperation. Their discursive content is
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quite different, insofar as one seeks to redeem a sense of Western civilizational
identity from the apocalyptic threat of “Islamization” whereas the other seeks
to redeem a sense of white racial identity from the deracinating schemes of
“world-Jewry”, but their narrative structures are homologous. In September
2015, Frank Gaffney invited Jared Taylor, an avowed white nationalist and
key Alt-Right figure, onto his radio show to discuss a recent article Taylor
had written about the European migrant “crisis”, entitled “Is This the Death
of Europe?” (Taylor 2015). Taylor’s narrative of European crisis and decline
differed from Gaffney’s only in being more explicitly racialized. Praising pre-
vious generations of Europeans who “fought Muslim invaders for 1,000
years – from 732 at the Battle of Poitiers to 1683 at the gates of Vienna”,
thereby guaranteeing the existence of Europe “as we know it”, Taylor lamen-
ted the fact that today’s “spineless” white Europeans “don’t have the nerve” to
turn back or kill the “endless waves” of non-whites crossing the Mediterranean
(American Renaissance 2015). Gaffney later removed the interview from his
website and disavowed Taylor’s views on race, following criticism from civil
rights groups (SPLC 2015). Yet Taylor’s racial politics were already implicit in
Gaffney’s own description of the flow of refugees as an “invasion”, a term
that clearly implies an ethnic rather than civic conception of European iden-
tity, one that is hereditary and territorial rather than contractarian, or else
why would legal migration and acquisition of citizenship by Muslims (or
anyone else) amount to an “invasion”? These philosophical affinities have
led some white nationalists to view the counter-jihad movement as a poten-
tial “recruitment pool” (Griffin 2013, 28), if only its activists can be convinced
that “Islamization” is merely one facet of a wider Jewish plot to destroy the
white race by promoting non-white immigration.
Conclusion
The counter-jihad, the Trumpian Republicans, and the avowed racists and mis-
ogynists of the Alt-Right converge on two things: first, a shared horror and
dismay at the cultural and demographic changes for which the term “Islami-
zation” is metonymous; and, second, inasmuch as “Islamization” is “just a
symptom” and the real enemy “lies within”, also a shared hatred of the “poli-
tics of ‘68”, which stands accused of abetting these transformations. Insofar as
they seek to reverse the progressive social changes brought about by “the ‘68
movement”, all three tendencies are recognizably forms of “revolutionary con-
servatism”, in Osborne’s formal sense. From this perspective, it is not some
shared ideological “essence” (typically defined as a form of nationalism)
that unites these different tendencies and justifies their collective characteriz-
ation as “far right”.4 Rather, it is their common, counterrevolutionary temporal
structure, wherein a mythic past is mobilized to legitimate projects of cultural
purification in the present. This counterrevolutionary temporal structure is
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also what places all three tendencies in close proximity to “classical” Fascism
and Nazism, despite important differences in their discursive content and
mobilizing myths. Today, this counterrevolutionary temporal structure is
inscribed in the Trumpian slogan “make America great again”.
Recent attempts to situate emergent far-right tendencies in relation to
their interwar antecedents have typically taken one of two forms: either
downplaying ideological differences, such as orientations towards Jews and
gays, and viewing new far-right tendencies as part of a historically continuous
“fascist” tradition (e.g. Alessio and Meredith 2014); or, alternatively, emphasiz-
ing those differences and consequently placing new far-right tendencies
under the wholly separate analytical framework of “right-populism” (e.g.
Dostal 2015). In this context, it bears emphasis that the enemy in the Schmit-
tian sense does not denote a specific, transhistorical racial or cultural sub-
stance: the enemy is simply “the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for
his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something
different and alien” (Schmitt 2007, 27). Moreover, the external enemy has a
very specific function in these philosophies: that of bringing about group
unity through hostile polarization against a third party (Palaver 2007). The
invocation of such an enemy is, by implication, typically symptomatic of an
unresolved “endogenous” social conflict. Significant here is Gates of Vienna’s
claim that the war being waged by the counter-jihadists is “a civil war
within the West”, fought by the representatives of “traditional Western
culture” against “the forces of politically correct multicultural Marxism” (May
2006).
In the interwar European context, the apocalyptic threat of “Judaization” –
a term that stood in for a variety of modernist afflictions such as liberalism,
democracy, socialism and feminism – served to generate the affective ener-
gies necessary for a violent counterrevolution against the “Spirit of 1789”.
Today, in a context of growing demotic anti-Muslim sentiment, the apocalyp-
tic threat of “Islamization” – the distinctivemythos of the counter-jihad – func-
tions to generate the requisite affective energies for a colossal international
counterrevolutionary assault on the “Spirit of ‘68” and the politics of the
New Left.
Notes
1. See Bhatt (2012), Denes (2012) and Fekete (2012) for early analyses of the move-
ment. See Ekman (2015) and Lee (2016) for more recent assessments.
2. In total, 418 web pages were analysed from 97 sites. Sites were identified using
an online social network analysis, starting with self-identified counter-jihad web-
sites and using web crawler software to map outbound links to other sites.
Counter-jihadist interviewees were purposively selected for their roles in orga-
nizing or networking within counter-jihad circles. Non-counter-jihadist intervie-
wees were purposively selected from anti-racist and civil rights communities for
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their experience of monitoring or organizing against counter-jihad groups. For
ethical reasons, all quotations have been anonymized.
3. See also Gilroy (1996) for a discussion of “revolutionary conservatism” as a
generic term, shorn of its specifically interwar German associations.
4. A recent paper by Bjørgo and Ravndal (2019) typifies the ideational approach
that currently dominates the literature, under the influence of Roger Griffin’s
(1993) conceptualisation of fascism as “palingenetic ultra-nationalism”. Accord-
ing to this paper, the far right is united by a common ideological core of nation-
alism, which then takes different forms (cultural, ethnic and racial) in different
far-right movements. It is difficult to see how this typology can accommodate
forms of organized misogyny, such as “men’s rights” groups with male-only
but mixed-ethnicity memberships, whose ideologies revolve around masculinity
rather than whiteness. The importance of such groups within the Alt-Right and
related movements seems to confirm Kathleen Blee’s (2018) warning about the
dangers of treating gender as epiphenomenal to a politics fundamentally about
nation and race.
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